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even more autonomy and flexibility. Their high birth and mortality rates clearly reflect changing market conditions as well as official policies.3 Large numbers of small private enterprises (6.1 million at the end of 1988) and several thousand joint ventures (including 1,242 involving nonresident investors) round out the roster of Chinese industrial firms. 4 With the exception of the larger joint-venture firms, these units occupy the market-oriented extreme of China's industrial system. Data availability confines our study to independent accounting units within the state and collective segments of industry (which includes mining and utilities as well as manufacturing) at or above the township level. We exclude industrial activities that are administratively situated within nonindustrial units, such as furniture-making shops maintained by universities, as well as private and joint-venture firms and all village-level industrial activity.
The implications of these limitations are demonstrated in table 1, which provides a brief quantitative description of Chinese industry in 1978 and 1988. The state and collective independent accounting units 242 Economic Development and Cultural Change included in our analysis dominate industrial output; they account for 92% of industrial production in 1978 and 86% of total output (78% if village-level enterprise is added to the total) in 1988. 5 Partial information on the composition of industrial output, shown in table 2, reveals similarities as well as differences in the composition of output in the two segments of industry. Machinery is uniformly larger than any other component, contributing about one-quarter of state and one-third of collective-sector output. Apparel and building materials occupy much larger positions in the collective sector than in state industry. Food processing and metallurgy contribute much more to the output total for state than for collective industry.
The data show distinct signs of structural convergence. Without exception, the share in collective industrial output for each branch shown in table 2 moves toward the corresponding branch share in the state-sector total. Table 2 also conceals important differences between state and collective activity within single branches of industry. In machinery, for example, large and complex items are made almost exclusively by state firms, while collective units tend to specialize in producing simple, standardized machines or components.
The data show much greater structural change in collective than in state industry, suggesting that aggregate production technology may be less stable for collective than for state industry. We will return to this issue in Section V.
III. Previous Work
In spite of two waves of industrial reform-the broadening of enterprise autonomy during 1979-83 and the expansion of product markets and price reforms beginning in 1984-the World Bank and other interested analysts speculated well into the 1980s that new policies had failed to end the long stagnation of productivity in China's state industry. 6 Using reconstructed factor input data and applying improved analytic methods, K. Chen et al. conclude that, after stagnating during 1957-78, multifactor productivity (capital and labor) in state industry grew at a rate of 4%-5% per annum during 1978-85. 7 Subsequent papers by K.-T. Lau and J. C. Brada and by M. Beck and A. Bohnet use these revised data to estimate frontier production functions for the purpose of identifying sources of year-to-year productivity change. These authors confirm the broad pattern of productivity change reported by Chen et al. 8 G. H. Jefferson uses 1984 cross-section data to examine the production technologies of state and collective industry.9 He finds that the marginal returns to labor are considerably higher within the state sector, while returns to capital are substantially higher within the collective sector. In contrast to the time-series results in Chen et al., Jefferson investigates sources of productivity differences among 120 enterprises within China's iron and steel sector and the pace of productivity change within the iron and steel sector as a whole. 12 The results underscore the importance of price regimes, asset types and vintages, and scale economies in explaining productivity differences.
In one of several World Bank studies of the TVE sector, J. Svejnar finds that technical change within this sector occurred at a high average annual rate of 14.5% during 1978-86.13 However, this result, like that of McGuckin et al., is sensitive to the weights used and may also reflect the impact of inflation.
All of these studies restrict their analysis to a net output framework that focuses on capital and labor but excludes materials inputs (including energy), which often constrain China's industrial production. None of these studies draws direct comparisons between the productivity performance of the state and collective sector over time. Previous work has not investigated whether returns to capital, labor, and materials between China's state and collective sectors have converged or diverged, a key issue in evaluating the success of China's urban reforms. The following analysis seeks to fill these gaps.
IV. Data Issues and Statistical Profile
Comparative analysis of productivity performance in state and collective industry requires constant price measures of gross industrial output value, fixed assets, and intermediate inputs (alternatively referred to as materials), along with physical measures of labor. Table 3 presents basic data from Chinese statistical sources covering gross and net output and capital and labor inputs for state and collective industry during 1979-88. '4 The figures for employment (col. 8) and total fixed assets (cols. 4, 7) include nonindustrial resources used to provide housing, schools, health facilities, and other services for industrial workers and their families. In addition to these series, which resemble the data used in earlier productivity studies, we now have a series (OPF*) that includes only the original (gross) value of fixed assets used for industrial produc- In order to measure comparative rates of change in overall sectoral efficiency, it is necessary to obtain weights to combine independent measures of capital, labor, and material productivity. Also, since single-factor productivity measures are average rather than marginal measures, they cannot be used to compare the marginal revenue products of capital, labor, and materials between the state and collective sectors. To determine whether these factor returns are converging or diverging over time, we need output elasticities derived from production function estimates to rescale our measures of average productivity.
V. Production Function Estimates
In their investigation of the long-term productivity performance of state-owned industry, Chen et al. estimate weights for capital and labor from time-series data.19 Unfortunately, we have no time series long enough to permit the estimation of a production function for collective industry. We therefore turn to cross-section data for 1984 and 1987. These data, taken from yearbooks of urban statistics, provide observations of output and input for state and collective industry for each of several hundred cities and counties for these 2 years.
Since our focus is on the contribution of labor, capital, and materials to output at the level of the state or collective sector, rather than the technological characteristics of the individual localities in the sample, we use the Cobb-Douglas function to estimate factor output elasticities that are assumed to be constant across all observations within each sector. Moreover, due to the extent of structural change within Chinese industry, particularly within the collective sector (table 2) , rather than using a flexible functional form, we test the intertemporal stability of Cobb-Douglas estimates obtained from data at different points during the reform program. This strategy reflects our belief that changing factor output elasticities are likely to take the form of changes in curvature rather than movements along a stable production function. For both sectors, the function is specified as follows: The second reason for using the intensive form of equation (1) is to reduce the impact of the nonindustrial components included in the input data. Because these data include nonindustrial fixed assets and workers associated with the operation of housing, schools, health facilities, and other services that industrial enterprises supply to their employees, they are not true measures of industrial inputs.22 However, using the capital-labor and the materials-labor ratios rather than the input levels can reduce the extent of measurement error and estimation bias. This is because the errors embedded in the observed values of capital, labor, and materials should be positively correlated, causing ratios of these variables to be measured with less error than either component of the ratio. In principle, a set of instrumental variables could remedy the biases associated with the use of input data that include nonindustrial components and a measure of average enterprise size based upon a broader sample than the output data. Our data, however, are not adequate for this purpose. Instead, we use the intensive form of the production function and create an instrumental variable only for the scale variable, q, since q potentially suffers both from measurement error and simultaneity bias. 23 We estimate equation ( We estimate equation (3) using a novel frontier procedure that appears more appropriate for the task and the data than conventional frontier methods. In the present context, standard frontier approaches are not appropriate, since, for purposes of comparing sectors, we require descriptions of the technical properties of the sectoral aggregates for state and collective industry.26 Since measurement error, the retention of extensive nonindustrial inputs, and administered prices may account for the apparent inefficiencies of the observations most "off" the production function, we choose to omit a large fraction of these observations. At the same time, because of measurement error and pricing practices that unduly inflate output values or limit the cost of inputs, we cannot rely on a few extreme observations to determine the frontier. By limiting the sample to approximately one-third of the more efficient observations, while purging the sample of a small number of observations at the frontier (less than 10) that appear to affect the stability of the estimates, our quasi-production function approach obtains estimates from a part of the sample that is relatively efficient in the technical and institutional sense and yet more broadly representa- Estimates of the vintage coefficients (table 6) 
VI. Sources of Growth and Productivity Change
Using the adjusted input and output data (table 4) and the normalized estimates of the output elasticities for capital, labor, and materials (table 6), we can calculate comparative rates of sectoral productivity change and describe the sources of sectoral growth. We calculate the rate of growth of total-factor productivity using the following expression:
where tfp is the exponential growth rate of total-factor productivity and the right-hand variables are exponential growth rates for DGV, DNPF, LAB, and DINT ( Table 7 , which contains the outcome of these calculations, reveals that the major impetus to growth within both sectors came from rapid expansion of material inputs combined with large values of the output elasticity for materials. Productivity growth made the second-largest contribution to growth in both sectors, with expansion of fixed assets and labor accounting for positive but small shares of incremental output.30 Rising material inputs accounted for slightly more than half of both state and collective output growth during 1980-88. Substitution of materials for capital and labor during this period raised the productivity of labor and capital among both state and collective producers. Within both sectors, the growth of total-factor productivity also contributed to the growth of output, accounting for slightly more than one-fourth of increased production. Productivity growth was higher in collective (4.63% annual increase) than in state (2.40% annual growth) industry. Both segments show a pattern of accelerating growth of total-factor productivity during the 1980s.
Total-factor productivity growth can be decomposed into technical change and changes in enterprise scale. Productivity increases resulting from the growth of enterprise scale are calculated as P(dgvn), where p emerges from the estimation of equation (3) table 7 show the results of this decomposition. Although scale economies have made small but consistent contributions to growth and productivity change, the increase in total-factor productivity is primarily attributable to "technical change," that is, increases in output per unit of combined factor input, holding enterprise scale constant.
VII. The Level and Dispersion of Factor Returns
In a market economy, profit-seeking behavior on the part of sellers and buyers tends to erode intersectoral and interregional differences in returns to labor, capital, or materials. Divergent returns signal the presence of opportunities to increase output without extra resources or new technologies. In a planned economy, pressure to improve financial performance is conspicuously absent. Long-term subsidy arrangements often create and maintain widely divergent factor returns. Furthermore, the constant reshuffling of resources required to eliminate differences in factor returns may be difficult or even illegal. As a result, a planned economy, unlike a market system, generates little or no momentum toward the convergence of returns to labor, capital, or materials in different enterprises, trades, or regions.
This sharp distinction between the outcome of plan and market systems opens the way to a quantitative evaluation of the reform process now under way in China and other socialist economies. If reform policies expand the role of market forces, competition should begin to erode long-standing divergences in factor returns. Tests for the convergence of returns thus offer a sensitive gauge of progress toward China's goal of injecting market forces into the plan system. Although this is not attempted here, it should be possible to measure the contribution of this convergence process to raising efficiency, as resources gravitate from lower-to higher-productivity activities.32
To this point, we measure productivity exclusively in real terms. These modest shifts toward intersectoral convergence of returns to capital and labor are surprising because China's capital markets appear to be strongly segmented, while labor markets appear to be among the less developed aspects of China's nascent market network. Industrial reform has, however, brought a new system of profit retention and encouraged the development of formal and informal sources of investment capital outside the state planning system. These changes have allowed collective firms and small state enterprises to augment their stocks of capital rapidly despite their limited access to government funds. This process has narrowed differences between the capital intensity of small and large enterprises and contributed to the convergence of intersectoral factor returns.
Marginal returns to materials, also shown in 3. The growth of material inputs accounts for roughly one-half of total output growth, with lesser contributions coming from productivity, capital, and labor.
4. Differential growth of the collective sector relative to the state sector is due principally to more rapid expansion of material inputs, followed by the contributions of productivity change, capital, and labor, all of which grew faster in collective than in state industry.
5. If productivity growth is divided into two components representing technical change and scale economies, the contribution of the former component is far larger than the latter.
6. Even so, and notwithstanding the proliferation of small enterprises, we find positive scale effects in both state and collective industry, although our analysis cannot evaluate the efficiency consequences of the changing size distribution of industrial firms.
7. Comparison of nominal marginal factor returns across state and collective industry reveals modest shifts toward convergence of returns during the early (labor) or later (capital) years of the 1980s. We were surprised to find virtual identity of marginal returns to materials across state and collective industry in nearly every year. The results for labor and capital suggest modest progress toward the reform objective of injecting market-like outcomes into China's industrial economy.
Our study draws on a wide variety of Chinese data, including some that have yet to receive careful scrutiny from Chinese or outside researchers. We are particularly concerned about three areas: industrial price trends, industrial output indicators, and equipment deflators, where the possibility of measurement error seems considerable.
Chinese markets for industrial goods remain heavily regulated. Sellers encounter price limits, restrictions on the location of sales activity, and moral suasion, all intended to limit price increases.40 These measures, aimed chiefly at large SOEs, create a strong presumption that the rate of industrial price increase is higher in the collective than in the state sector. Yet the price indexes derived from statistics of industrial output value at current and constant prices consistently show the opposite tendency (table 4) . Published reports41 and interview data indicating that newly established collective units sometimes substitute current for 1980 prices in calculating real output growth suggest that the output price indexes (DEFQ) in table 4 may contain distortions that have the effect of exaggerating the relative productivity performance of collective industry. Finally, product innovation, which sometimes leads to the use of current prices to calculate deflated output totals, may inject an upward bias into estimates of output growth in both state and collective industry. 42 Even if our price indexes for industrial products are satisfactory, it is still possible that measures of real output (DGV) may suffer from upward bias. 43 If, as appears likely, the expansion of small-scale industry and the proliferation of markets for components and intermediate goods has encouraged a reduction in the average degree of vertical integration, the gross output measure used by Chinese statisticians may overstate the expansion of real output.
It is essential to recognize that the productivity consequences of measurement errors in output statistics are not easy to predict. Since the products of one industry often become intermediate inputs for another, revision of the output totals affects both the numerator and denominator of many productivity ratios. As an example of counterintuitive results, we may observe that a reduction in real output growth to correct innovation bias concentrated in the machinery industry might raise the measured productivity of capital.
Deflators for industrial fixed assets are based on data for construction costs and machinery prices. Our price index for machinery comes from the ratio between annual machinery output valued at current and constant prices (GV/DGV). Interviews conducted by ourselves and by Barry Naughton, as well as Jefferson's estimates concerning the bias of output growth within the machine-building industry, all indicate that machinery prices have outpaced the small increases obtained from ratios of GV/DGV, in which case the equipment component of our fixed asset deflator (DEFK) is flawed.
Our study directs attention to several opportunities for further research. We need to understand the magnitude and consequences of possible sources of measurement error. Not only our own results but assertions about the dynamism of collective industry and even estimates of national product growth during the past decade depend critically on the validity of the data underlying this study.
Our preliminary effort to study changes in marginal factor returns across two segments of industry shows the importance of working toward a more general framework for identifying the sources of convergence (or divergence) of factor returns, including changes in relative prices, factor deepening, technical change, and scale economies. This type of analysis could be used to examine progress toward market-like outcomes across sectors and over time, not only in China's economy but under any circumstances of economic disequilibrium. 
We obtain the 1979 year-end net value of productive fixed assets (which is assumed equal to the deflated net value of productive fixed assets at the end of 1979) by converting the net value of 1979 year-end total fixed assets using the ratio of productive to total fixed assets valued at original cost: NPF9 = DNPF9 = NF9 x (OPF*/OF*)79.
(A3)
We compute annual increments to the stock of fixed assets used for industrial production as follows:
DGI, = (OPF*-OPF,* )/DEFK,,
where DEFK is the investment goods deflator constructed according to the procedure described below. We compute deflated depreciation (DCC) as follows: 
and where OPF*9 is a year-end figure for 1979. We have found no data related to scrapping of fixed assets. We therefore assume there is no scrapping of productive capital (S):
Reported series include original and net valuations of total year-end fixed assets (OF*, NF*) and original value of productive (Gongye shengchan yong, i.e., "used for industrial production") fixed assets (OPF*). The total depreciation fund (CC) is also available. This enables us to calculate the annual depreciation rate 8 = cc/OF*, which we assume to be constant across productive and nonproductive capital. 33. To express real fixed assets in nominal terms, we multiply DNPF by DEFK, the deflator for fixed assets. The result is a measure of fixed assets that corresponds to GV, our measure of industrial output in terms of current prices.
34. See the annex for estimates of MRF, the major repair fund. 35. These results do not necessarily conflict with the common observation that Chinese enterprises appear to employ more resources than are required
